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ABSTRACT 
This paper introduced NgViz, a tool that examines DNS traffic 
and shows anomalies in n-gram frequencies. This is accomplished 
by comparing input files against a fingerprint of legitimate traffic. 
Both quantitative analysis and visual aids are provided that allow 
the user to make determinations about the legitimacy of the DNS 
traffic. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]:  Network Opera-
tions 
General Terms 
Measurement, Security, Experimentation, Algorithms 
Keywords 
Anomaly Detection, Network Traffic Analysis, DNS, Tunnel 
Detection, Character Frequency Analysis, Visualization 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent research has seen a large push toward the visualization of 
network traffic. The VisSec community uses the mind’s spatial 
reasoning capability to recognize anomalies and patterns that 
cannot be easily captured through algorithms and computation. 
However, little work has been done in using visualization to help 
cyber security detect DNS tunnels.  
 
DNS tunnels allow protocols blocked by a network policy to be 
encapsulated inside DNS queries and responses. Iodine [8], TCP-
over-DNS [12], and Dns2tcp [5] are just a few examples of open 
source DNS tunnels widely available. 
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In 1932, Zipf [15] pioneered character frequency analysis of the 
English language. Shannon [12] extended his work by examining 
the entropy of the language. Since that time, character frequency 
analysis has been heavily applied to cryptography and language 
recognition. Recently, character frequency analysis was explored 
for its feasibility in detecting DNS tunnels [2]. Similar to natural 
language, it was shown that domains and subdomains found in 
DNS queries and responses often follow a recognizable 
fingerprint, whereas a DNS tunnels have significantly higher 
entropy that heavily skews the character frequencies away from 
the typical domain fingerprint. NgViz was created as an extension 
of that research, automating the visualization and analysis of DNS 
traffic. 
 
NgViz performs n-gram frequency analysis on DNS traffic by 
comparing an input file against a fingerprint of legitimate traffic. 
Quantitative analysis and visual aids are combined to give the user 
as much information as possible to make determinations about the 
legitimacy of the DNS traffic. 
 
Visualizing DNS traffic is not a new concept. The dynamic 
behavior of DNS was demonstrated by Ren [11] while 
introducing  the visual metaphor Flying Term. However, this 
research focused on reflection and amplication attacks along with 
cache poisoning. Plonka and Barford [9] used visualization to 
differentiate between canonical, overloaded, and unwanted DNS 
queries by applying context-aware clustering. Neither approach 
examined the visualization of DNS tunnel traffic. 
 
Tunnel detection has seen significant research in the past. Borders 
[1] explored detecting HTTP tunnels by examining request 
regularity, inter-request delay, bandwidth usage, and transaction 
size. In contrast, Crotti [3,4] and Dusi [6] attempted to detect 
tunnels from lower in the protocol stack by looking at the inter-
arrival time, order, and size of the traffic packets. Hind [7] 
explored detecting DNS tunnels using artificial neural networks 
trained off the average packet length, average number of distinct 
domains, average length of packets to that domain, the average 
number of distinct characters in the lower level domain, and the 
distance between lower level domains. While many of these 
methods show promise, it is still vital to explore other solutions 
that will offer a reduction in the false positives found with the 
methods above. A combined approach should be used for 
maximum effectiveness. 
 
2. METHODS 
Firstly, NgViz must be given a file of domains to represent the 
fingerprint of legitimate traffic. This file will be used for 
comparisons against all other traffic files. Comparison files may 
supplied, or they can be generated from pcap files [10] using the 
included NgViz pcap parser. Many networks may have a slightly 
altered fingerprint of legitimate traffic. Therefore, the best 
approach is using traffic local to the network being analyzed. 
 
For each unique n-gram found in an input file, a new entry into a 
hashmap is created. This hashmap stores the number of times each 
n-gram has been seen in the data set. Optionally, duplicate 
subdomains can be removed, analyzing the traffic only when new 
subdomain are seen. This is beneficial to tunnel detection, and is 
recommended. 
 
Firstly, each n-gram’s rank is compared to the rank of the same n-
gram in the fingerprint. The distance between the two ranks is the 
first element used when calculating a match between the two files. 
It is a primary component in the calculation for rank_match 
(defined below). Secondly, the frequency of the n-gram is 
compared to the frequency of the same ranking n-gram in the 
fingerprint file (which may or may not be the same characters). 
This measurement is a primary component of freq_match (defined 
below), and helps determine whether the two files have a similar 
drop in frequency from one rank to the next. The lack of a similar 
Zipfian distribution is a sign that there may be a tunnel in the 
DNS traffic. The formula for total match is shown below: 
 
rank_match = (#n-grams – avg(rank diff) / #n-grams)a 
freq_match = (∑(pct of  fingerprint freq) / #n-grams)b 
total_match = rank_match*x + freq_match*y    {x+y = 1} 
 
A tunnel might be masked by a large amount of legitimate traffic 
from other sources and destinations. This is mitigated in several 
ways. Firstly, the pcap parser can split the traffic into separate 
files based on either IP address or domain. Tunnels typically 
operate over one domain, modifying the subdomain with each 
request. Separating the domains into different files allows each 
domain to be analyzed individually. Alternatively, a DNS tunnel 
may be deployed over several different domains, using an 
algorithm similar to round-robin to switch between them. Also, 
multiple IP addresses may be sending legitimate traffic to a 
domain also being used as a tunnel, effectively masking the tunnel 
in the noise. By segregating the IP address, it can be analyzed 
without the added noise seen while analyzing a particular domain. 
 
Along with splitting traffic by IP address and domain, it is also 
necessary to look at it from a temporal perspective. The IP or 
domain may only be part of a tunnel for a brief subset of the DNS 
queries/responses. Therefore, the tool provides the ability to 
“split” on a specified interval of data points. The results are then 
sorted from highest match to lowest total match, making it simple 
to find the traffic that is furthest from the fingerprint. An example 
of this would be analyzing the traffic of specific IP address every 
100 queries.  
 
However, this strategy has the pitfall of being heavily skewed by a 
domain containing several subdomains that all have similar labels. 
This will cause the frequencies of the n-grams in that label to 
jump disproportionality high. Because of this, an option to graph 
the drop in frequency from one n-gram to the next was added. 
While this scenario will be highlighted as a poor match when 
viewing ranks and frequencies, it will also show several large 
spikes in the “change in frequency” graph that are not seen in 
tunnels or standard DNS traffic (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Spikes resulting from many 
subdomains with a similar label 
 
3. RESULTS 
A fingerprint file of legitimate traffic was built using Alexa’s list 
of the 1,000,000 most popular domain names for 2009 [14]. This 
is postulated to provide a better representation of DNS n-gram 
distributions than English, which may be skewed by prepositions 
and pronouns that are not seen as often in subdomains. A custom 
website crawler was used to simulate “typical” internet traffic. 
The website crawler visited thousands of popular websites, 
capturing queries for linked sites and ads similar to what would be 
seen by a typical internet user. 
 
The first experiment split the simulated traffic every 100 unique 
subdomains and compared the data sets to the traffic from three 
popular DNS tunnels: Iodine [8], TCP-over-DNS [13], and 
Dns2tcp [5]. The three tunnels all showed the lowest match, 
ranging from a 43% match to a 35% match (see blue outlines in 
Figures 2 and 3, below), whereas the simulated traffic matched 
between 81% and 60% in all cases. 
 
The second experiment analyzed 500 unique subdomains using 
bigrams instead of unigrams (comparing two character groupings 
instead of single characters). The results were more pronounced, 
showing a greater than 80% match for all simulated traffic while 
the tunnels matched at 26% or less. This is attributed to bigrams 
providing significantly more data points, decreasing the chances 
tunneled traffic will match domain traffic appropriately. 
 
While bigrams showed greater results, it must be noted that each 
additional n-gram character requires exponential increases in 
computation and memory. Additionally, accuracy requires more 
data than is necessary with smaller n-grams because of the large 
range of possible matches. It is hypothesized that trigrams will 
offer similar results with a large enough data set. However, results 
using unigram and bigram analysis appear to be sufficient. 
 
 Figure 2: NgViz unigram traffic analysis comparing simulated traffic to DNS tunnels 
 
 
Figure 3: NgViz frequency comparison between tunnels and legitimate traffic 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Combining visualization with quantitative analysis has proven to 
be a very effective method of detecting malicious DNS traffic. 
Both unigrams and bigrams were shown to provide sufficient 
capabilities in pinpointing non-conforming traffic. 
 
Defeating n-gram analysis will require DNS tunnels to pad the 
exfiltrated data with characters that more closely match typical n-
gram distributions. However, this will greatly reduce the 
bandwidth of the tunnel, requiring an increase in the amount of 
DNS traffic sent out of the malicious system. 
 
While a match value around 50% has proved to be a good 
threshold for unigram analysis, it is important to note that 
different thresholds will be appropriate for different types of 
networks and different n-gram configurations. This will also vary 
depending on the constants a and b in the rank_match and 
freq_match calculations, respectively. Similarly, false positive and 
false negative rates are left to future research where several 
network data sets will be analyzed. 
 
Future work will involve developing a real-time, automated DNS 
monitor that alerts administrators of anomalies in network DNS 
traffic. N-gram analysis will be combined with other effective 
methods of tunnel detection such as examining subdomain length 
and identifying anomalous flows out of a system on the network. 
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